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Abstract 
Fraud and corruption have devastating effects, especially on the poorest citizens of developing countries and have 
spread even to countries once considered “clean.” Public sector bribery, fraud, and other forms of corruption have 
become leading concerns for legislators around the globe, as the diversion of public funds undermines control of the 
public purse and robs public policies of resources to ensure sustainable development. This paper discusses the 
different theories and strategies adopted by fraudsters, identify the different methods of combating this “cancer” in 
developed and developing countries outside the external audit approaches, and evaluate the external audit approach. 
It proposes strategies that are beyond compliance to external audit procedures and rules that will empower the 
citizens (principal) to demand for and enforce accountability from the public officials (agents). Thus, allowing for 
sustainable development. It argues that for these strategies to work effectively, a change in audit emphasis and a 
given level of decentralization is required. The principles and strategies presented in this paper can be considered by 
donor agencies to countries where fraud and corruption interfere with good governance. 
Keywords: corruption and fraud, accountability, audit and governance 
 
1. Introduction 
Sustainable development depends largely on the provision of public goods and services. Over the years, considerable 
expenditures and investments have been made by governments, institutions and concerned agencies to ensure 
sustainable development. This development has remained a mirage because the goods and services are failing; falling 
short of the potential to improve outcomes. They are often inaccessible or prohibitively expensive. However, when 
accessible they are dysfunctional, extremely low in technical quality and unresponsive to the needs of diverse 
clientele (World Bank, 2004). Internationally corruption is known to be responsible for these failures and is a 
daunting obstacle to the sustainability of developmental activities. Given the growing evidence of the detrimental 
impact of corruption on sustainable development, concerns about corruption have mounted in recent years (World 
Bank, 2004). The list of this evidence is long and deserving of the attention given. 
Corruption slows GDP growth (Abed and Davoodi 2000; Mauro 1995) and adversely affects capital accumulation 
(Lambsdorff 1999a, 1999b). It lowers the quality of education (Gupta, Davoodi, and Tiongson 2000), public 
infrastructure (Tanzi and Davoodi 1997) and health services (Tomaszewska and Shah 2000; Treisman 1999). It 
reduces the effectiveness of development aid and increases income inequality and poverty (Gupta, Davoodi, and 
Alonso-Terme 1998). Bribery, often the most visible manifestation of public sector corruption, harms the reputation 
of and erodes trust in the State. Corrupt and poor governance make it more difficult for the poor and other 
disadvantaged groups and minorities, to obtain public services. Corruption affect macroeconomic stability, when, for 
example, the allocation of debt guarantees based on cronyism or fraud in financial institutions leads to a loss of 
confidence by savers, investors, and foreign exchange markets. 
The Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) scandal, uncovered in 1991, the corrupt practices at Mehran 
Bank in the Sindh Province of Pakistan in the mid-1990s, the Oceanic and Intercontinetal Bank Nigeria scandals 
uncovered in 2009, the Nigerian pension fund and oils subsidy Fraud uncovered in 2012, are few examples of 
corruption with dare public consequences. Sad to note that often time this crimes are not uncovered in the accounting 
and auditing process.  For example, the BCCI scandal led to the financial ruin of Gabon, the corrupt practices at 
Mehran Bank in the Sindh Province of Pakistan and the Oceanic and Intercontinetal Bank Nigeria led to loss of 
public confidence in these countries banking system. The Nigerian pension fund and oil subsidy fraud led to loss of 
confidence and trust in the government. The numerous consequences of corruption are summarized by Cavil and 
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Sohail (2007:8). 
The authenticating function of accounting, external auditing has had it fair share of blame, criticism and failures. 
Without ignoring the collapse of blue chip firms with ‘unqualified audit (clean) reports’ in developed and developing 
countries, the recent (2007) economic meltdown that has grounded economies and firms are blamed on the 
oversights of the accounting watchdogs (auditors or audit firms). This has resulted in untold loses and hardship, 
litigation of one form or the other and stringent audit rules to guide against a repeat and to cripple corruption. 
However, amidst these improvements and reforms, corruption still thrives and infects the systems of governance. 
Several techniques, methods and policy reforms have been suggested and some implemented to combat this 
infectious monster. However, as new strategies are introduced to disrupt corruption, the fraudsters-the agents-invents 
new techniques and improve the loopholes even in the new strategies to counter the disruption, thus leaving these 
methods ineffective. Are nations doomed to corruption? Can corruption be disrupted? What is responsible for the 
insignificant impact of existing strategies in combating corruption? What is the way forward? These questions define 
the objectives of this paper.  
To achieve these objectives, the paper is presented in 5 sections. Section 2 addresses the concepts, theories and 
frameworks, model, varieties and sophistication of corruption. Section 3 evaluates the different methods of 
combating corruption. Section 4 presents the proposed methods and the challenges. Section 5 is the summary and 
concluding remarks. 
2. The concepts, Theories and Empirical evidence of corruption  
2.1 The Concept of Corruption 
The word corruption comes from the Latin verb corruptus (to break); it means “broken object.”Conceptually, 
corruption is a form of behavior that departs from ethics, morality, tradition, law, and civic virtue. The World Bank 
and Transparency International treat corruption as the use of one’s public position for illegitimate private gains. 
Abuse of power and personal gain, however, can occur in the public and private domains, often through collusion by 
individuals from both sectors. The Lebanese, therefore, define corruption as the “behavior of private individuals or 
public officials who deviate from set responsibilities and use their position of power in order to serve private ends 
and secure private gains” (Kulluna, 1999). In simple and precise terms Corruption is the exercise of official powers 
against public interest (and includes both the public and private sectors) or the abuse of public office for private 
gains. For practical purposes, and for this discussion, the term is used to describe deception, bribery, forgery, 
extortion, fraud, theft, conspiracy, embezzlement, misappropriation, etc. 
Public sector corruption has become alarming and a driving force for private sector corruption to gain momentum. 
Public sector corruption is a symptom of failed governance (Cavil and Sohail, 2007). Governance is defined as the 
norms, traditions, and institutions by which power and authority in a country are exercised. These norms, traditions, 
and institutions include the institutions of participation and accountability in governance, mechanisms of citizen 
voice and exit, and norms and networks of civic engagement; the constitutional-legal framework and the nature of 
accountability relationships between citizens and government; the process by which governments are selected, 
monitored, held accountable, and renewed or replaced; and the legitimacy, credibility, and efficacy of the institutions 
that govern political, economic, cultural, and social interactions among citizens and between citizens and their 
governments (Shah, 2007). Issues and concern about corruption is as old as the history of government and man. In 
350 BC, Aristotle suggested in The Politics, “To protect the treasury from being defrauded, let all money be issued 
openly in front of the whole city, and let copies of the accounts be deposited in various wards.”  
2.1.2 Models, Variation and Sophistication of Corruption 
Corruption is not manifested in a single form. It typically takes at least five broad forms. Shah (2007) highlights the 
first four models, (a) Petty, administrative, or bureaucratic, (b) Grand, (c) State or regulatory capture and influence 
peddling, (d) Patronage, paternalism, clientelism, and being a “team player” and   (e) Systemic Corruption. These are 
discussed briefly. 
a) Petty, administrative, or bureaucratic corruption. Many corrupt acts are isolated transactions by individual 
public officials who abuse their office by demanding bribes and kickbacks, diverting public funds, or awarding 
favors in return for personal considerations. Such acts are often referred to as petty corruption, even though, in the 
aggregate, a substantial amount of public resources may be involved. 
b) Grand corruption. The theft or misuse of vast amounts of public resources by state officials (usually 
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members of, or people associated with, the political or administrative elite), false representation, concealment of 
material facts and fraud; constitutes grand corruption. Fraud is the use of deception with the intention of obtaining an 
advantage, avoiding an obligation, or causing loss to another party. Fraud is a deliberate act that usually involves the 
use of deception to obtain some form of financial benefit or advantage from a position of authority or trust that often 
results in some form of loss to the organization defrauded. It refers to dishonesty in the form of an intentional 
deception or a willful misrepresentation of a material fact. 
c) State or regulatory capture and influence peddling. State capture is the collusion by private actors with 
public officials or politicians for their mutual, private benefit. In this form of corruption, the private sector “captures” 
the state legislative, executive, and judicial apparatus for its own purposes. State capture coexists with the 
conventional (and opposite) view of corruption, in which public officials extort or otherwise exploit the private 
sector for private ends. 
d) Patronage, paternalism, clientelism, and being a “team player.” Corruption occurs when officials use their 
official position to provide assistance to clients or colleagues with the same geographic, ethnic, or cultural origin so 
that they receive preferential treatment in their dealings with the public sector, including public sector employment. 
e) Systemic corruption. Many countries in the world suffer from systemic corruption. This type of corruption 
is analogous to organized crime; participants act not independently but in concert with one another, maintaining the 
system that allows them to extract rents and taking their own share of the rents. 
2.2 The Theoretical Framework 
Public sector corruption depends on a multitude of factors, such as the quality of public sector management, the 
nature of accountability relations between the government and citizens, the legal framework, and the degree to which 
public sector processes are accompanied by transparency and dissemination of information. To understand why 
corruption persists and what can be done to combat it, it is necessary to understand relationships of stakeholders in 
an environment of corruption. At the theoretical level, a number of interesting ideas have been put forward. These 
ideas can be broadly grouped into three categories (Aidt, 2003 and Jain, 2001) from the oldest to the latest: (a) 
Principal-Agent models, (b) New Public Management perspectives, and (c) Neo-Institutional Economics 
frameworks. 
A. Principal-Agent Models 
Of the three theories of stakeholder’s relationships in a State, the most widely used is the principal-agent model. 
Although there are two variations, this model believes in the “crime and punishment” theory of Becker (1968), which 
opines that self-interested public officials seek out or accept bribes as long as the expected gains from corruption 
exceed the expected costs (detection and punishment) associated with corrupt acts. In this model the state is led and 
managed by a benevolent dictator (the principal). The main aim of the principal is to motivate other government 
officials (agents); this includes the citizens, to act with integrity in the use of public resources (Banfield 1975; 
Becker1968, 1983; Becker and Stigler 1974; Klitgaard 1988, 1997; Rose-Ackerman1975, 1978 and Shah, 2007). 
Thus, given the crime-punishment relationship, the principal can control corruption by reducing the number of 
transactions over which public officials have discretion. This reduction in the scope of gains (transactions with 
discretion), increases the possibility for restrain, or increasing the punishment for corruption. Based on the increased 
possibility of restrain, Klitgaard (1988) observes that in the principal-agent relationship in the State, corruption 
equals monopoly plus discretion minus accountability. 
In the first variation is without the legislators. In this variation, corruption can be reduced by rules-driven 
government that includes strong internal controls with little or no room for discretion by public officials (agents). 
This variation of the principal-agent model gained wide acceptance in public policy circles and served as a 
foundation for empirical research and policy design to combat administrative, bureaucratic, and petty corruption. 
However, this approach is not appropriate in highly corrupt countries, however, where the rules enforcers themselves 
add an extra burden of corruption and lack of discretion is thwarted by collusive behavior by corruptors. In fact, lack 
of discretion is often cited as a defense by corrupt officials who partake in corruption as part of a vertically well-knit 
network enjoying immunity from prosecution (Shah, 2007). 
The second variation of this model integrates the role of legislators and elected officials in the analysis.  Policy and 
legislation are manipulatively instituted in favor of particular interest groups (representing private sector interests 
and entities or individual units of public bureaucracy competing for higher budgets) in exchange for rents or side 
payments, by high-level government officials - represented by legislators or elected public officials. Legislators 
weigh the personal monetary gains from corrupt practices and improved chances of reelection against the chance of 
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being caught, punished, and losing an election with a tarnished reputation. 
Several factors affect this decision. These include: (a) campaign financing mechanisms, (b) information access by 
voters, (c) the ability of citizens to vote out corrupt legislators, (d) the degree of political contestability, (e) the type 
of electoral system, (f) the democratic institutions and traditions in place, and (g) the institutions of accountability in 
governance (Acconcia, D’Amato, and Martina 2003;Andvig and Moene 1990; Chand and Moene 1997; Flatters and 
Macleod 1995;Grossman and Helpman 1994;Rose-Ackerman1978; and Van Rijckeghem and Weder 2001). This 
conceptual framework is useful in analyzing political corruption or state capture. 
In analyzing corruption with this model, studies have shown varying conclusions with respect to centralization-
decentralization nexus. These studies reaffirm that corruption incidence is context dependent and cannot be 
unbundled by general models (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993; Arikan, 2004, Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2005; Waller, 
Verdier, and Gardner, 2002; and Ahlin, 2001). 
B. New Public Management Frameworks 
This model explains the relationship among the public sector mandate, its authorizing environment, and the 
operational culture and capacity. The NPM calls for fundamental civil service and political reforms to create a 
government that is under contract and accountable for results to the principal, the leader or manager of the State. The 
contractors are the public officials. The citizen’s mandate is in the hands of the principal. Under these reforms, public 
officials would no longer have permanent rotating appointments but instead would keep their jobs as long as they 
have fulfilled their contractual obligations (Shah 1999, 2005). According to Shah (2007) the New Public 
Management (NPM) literature reveals a more fundamental discordance among the public sector mandate, its 
authorizing environment, and the operational culture and capacity. This discordance contributes to government acting 
like a runaway train and government officials indulging in rent-seeking behaviors, with little opportunity for citizens 
to constrain government behavior. The NPM paradigm presents clear implications for the study of localization and 
corruption. It argues for contractual arrangements in the provision of public services. Such a contractual framework 
may encourage competitive service delivery through outsourcing, strengthening the role of local government as a 
purchaser but not necessarily a provider of local services. Where the citizens are empowered to demand 
accountability for results, opportunities for corruption is reduced and citizen-centered governance is produced. Thus, 
Andrews and Shah (2005a) argue that citizen empowerment holds the key to enhanced accountability and reduced 
opportunities for corruption. On the contrary, Batley (1999) and Von Maravic (2003) disagree with such conclusions 
and argue that NPM could lead to higher corruption rather than greater accountability, because the tendering for 
service delivery and separation of purchasers from providers may lead to increased rent-seeking behaviors and 
enhanced possibilities for corruption.  
C. Neo-Institutional Economics (NIE)Frameworks 
This theory is developed from the causes and cures for corruption. This theory is a principal-agent relationship but 
the agent is more advantaged than the principal and can only be effective as determined by the agent. The leader and 
public officials are the agents while the citizens are the incapacitated principals. The principal delegates the authority 
to the agent, who then accepts responsibility to perform some services or take certain actions, on the principal's 
behalf. In doing this, it is presumed that the agent will always act in the best interest of the principal (Adesanya & 
Oloyede, 1972). But according to Jensen and Meckling (1976), if both parties are utility maximizers, their interest 
could diverge. It would then become necessary for the principal to establish appropriate incentives for the agent and 
at the same time monitor his activities in order to maximize the incidence of possible divergence of interest. 
 The Neo-institutional economics presents a refreshing perspective on the sophistication of the causes and limited 
cures of corruption due to the divergence of interest. This model argues that corruption results from the opportunistic 
behavior of public officials (agents), as citizens (principals) are either not empowered to hold public officials 
accountable for their corrupt acts or face high transaction costs in doing so. The capacity of the Principal to act or 
deicide is limited to available or incomplete information provided by the principal. They face high transaction costs 
in acquiring and processing more information. In contrast, agents (public officials) are better informed (Shah, 2007). 
This asymmetry of information allows agents to indulge in opportunistic behavior that goes unchecked because of 
the high transaction costs faced by principals and the lack of adequate countervailing institutions to enforce 
accountability in governance. The internal control systems and other means (external audits) of checking the 
excesses of the agents are in control by the agents. The NIE theorist asserts that when the institutions, incentives and 
sanctions are gotten right, service providers use resources well, deliver required service and level of performance and 
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provide for those in need. Schleifer and Vishny (1992) argues that the above assertion is impossible in a centrally 
planned economy as bureaucrats have incentive to produce less services, cause shortages and collect bribes for 
under-produced services. Therefore, economic liberalization, political democratization and social modernization can 
disrupt corruption (Kaufmann, 1997). 
2.3 The Theories of Corruption and Empirical Evidence 
The neo-institutional economics theory of corruption explains the operations of corrupt public officials and the 
failures of accounting controls than the other two theories. This is supported by the empirical literature. The public 
officials have capitalized on their manipulative laws to improve on their capacity to defraud the helpless masses. The 
2004 World Bank study of Guatemala, Kenya, Latvia, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Tanzania, contains elaborate 
explanations and support. It identifies four causes of corruption based on in-depth country analysis: 
1. Weak or no commitment of national leaders to combating corruption. 
2. Lack of trust in the state as the guardian of the “public interest”. 
3. Weak rule of law.  
4. Ineffective Institutions of participation and accountability.  
These factors reveal why the principal is incapacitated and her areas of strength is crippled by the agent. This 
explains the failures of measures and reforms designed to combat corruption. Thus, it important to state the obvious 
that: 
1. Corruption endures in the public sector because public officials are either unwilling or unable to address it 
forcefully. In corrupt endemic societies, corruption touches the highest levels of government and many senior 
officeholders will not be motivated to work against it (in most cases they were brought in by these corrupt 
forces). 
2. There is little or no public acceptance of the notion that the role of the state is to rise above private interests to 
protect the broader public interest, in societies where there is systemic corruption. “Clientelism” - public 
officeholders focusing on serving particular client groups linked to them by ethnic, geographic, or other ties - 
shapes the public landscape, creating conditions that are ripe for corruption. The line between what is public and 
what is private is blurred, so that abuse of public office for private gain is a way of life. 
3. The immunity clause for public office holders (in Nigeria for instance) encourages public corruption. In such 
societies, law enforcement is often used as a device for furthering private interests rather than protecting the 
public interest. A dramatic example is the animal farm. A common symbol of the breakdown of the rule of law in 
highly corrupt countries is the police acting as lawbreakers rather than law enforcers (mounting road blocks to 
free armed robbers, kidnappers etc and stopping motorists for non-existing traffic violations as an excuse for 
extorting bribes, as in Nigeria). There is a compromise in the independence of the judiciary - a pillar of the rule 
of law – in countries with systemic corruption. 
However, societies with low level of public sector corruption have strong institutions of participation and 
accountability that control abuses of power by public officials. In these societies the principal has a voice. These 
institutions are either created by the state itself (for example, electoral process, citizens’ charter, bills of rights, 
auditors general, the judiciary, the legislature) or arise outside of formal state structures (for example, the news 
media and organized civic groups). This is the reverse in countries with systemic corruption. This relationship is 
summarized in Table 1. 
There is therefore the need to consider the various methods of combating corruption with special emphasis on 
external auditing. The audit or authentication process was designed to give the principal confidence and hope that her 
resources are properly managed to her advantage. How well this process has served the principal or used against her 
is addressed in the next section. 
3. Evaluation of the different methods of combating corruption and their pitfalls 
Relying on evidence that combating corruption and improving the rule of law can increase government revenue four 
times and ensure effective service delivery and sustainable developments, governments, donor agencies and 
concerned stakeholders of good governance have designed and implemented about 48 known measures to combat 
corruption aside from external audit and reliance on internal control.  
3. 1 Non-Accounting Measures 
However, the trend in the measures of fraud prevention, control and reduction reveals that accounting controls, 
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external auditing and the report thereof have lost their relevance. The users of accounting information have sought 
for solutions elsewhere. These measures are classified into: (a) Economic (b) Information Technology (c) 
Administrative reforms (d) Political reforms (e) Direct Democracy (f) Legal and Judicial (g) Behavioral measures. A 
summary of the trends in combating fraud and corruption is presented in Table 2. 
The trend reflects the paradigm shift in the sophistication of corruption and its ability to thrive by weakening control 
and enforcement systems. The problem is compounded by path dependency (the fact that a major break with the past 
is difficult to achieve, because major reforms are likely to be blocked by influential interest groups); cultural and 
historical factors; and attitudes, in which those who are victimized by corruption feel that attempts to deal with 
corruption will lead to further victimization, with little hope of corrupt actors being brought to justice. These 
considerations lead principals to the conclusion that any attempt on their part to constrain corrupt behaviors will 
invite strong retaliation from powerful interests. Therefore, citizen empowerment (through devolution, citizens’ 
charters, bills of rights, elections, and other forms of civic engagement) assumes critical importance in combating 
corruption, because it may have a significant impact on the incentives faced by public officials to be responsive to 
public interest. 
However, these measures of combating corruption have ignored the predicaments of the principal (the citizen) in 
their design except the behavioral measures, and focus on the systems designed by the agents (the public office 
holders). These systems are designed, re-designed and un-designed with loopholes to protect the agent or in way that 
it can be circumvented or beaten. The systems alone are always not the problem. The problem often is their 
implementation. Take for instance the system of separation of duties in internal control. Theoretically and in 
principle, it is perfect, but collusion (the human) factor makes implementation sometimes impossible and guarantees 
system failures. The behavioral measures also fail because they are founded and dependent on laws and systems that 
can be circumvented by the agents. Thus the agent thrives on continual improvement of strategies “to break” 
invented measures. 
3.2 The External Audit: The Loopholes and the Need for Beyond the Audit Procedures and Rules in Combating 
Corruption 
Auditing was ushered in when owners were no longer managers. Adam Smith said: "Being the managers rather of 
other people's money than of their own, it cannot well be expected that they should look over it with the same 
anxious vigilance with which the partners of a private company frequently watch over their own. Negligence and 
profusion . . . must always prevail, more or less, in the management of the affairs of such a company" (Smith, 1904 
ed: 233). Thus, auditing as an accounting function developed to give the owners (who are not managers’) reasonable 
assurance that the assets, resources and interest in an enterprise are safe guarded and protected. Their report were 
read in the open for governments in the olden days, hence the concept of audit has roots from the Latin term ‘audire,’ 
which means to hear. In early days an auditor used to listen to the accounts read over by an accountant in order to 
check them. The original objective of auditing was to detect and prevent errors and frauds. 
However, given the numerous developments in the auditing profession, the functions and objectives of auditing have 
undergone series of modifications. Currently, the major objective of external auditing is to examine the financial 
statements of an entity and provide management of the entity with a report expressing an opinion as to whether 
management’s assertion is fairly stated, in all material respects, based upon reasonable criteria. In achieving the 
above the auditors will obtain reasonable, rather than absolute evidence, that the financial statements are free from 
material misstatement, whether caused by error of fraud. Accordingly a material misstatement may remain 
undetected. Also, an audit is not designed to detect error and fraud that is immaterial to the financial statement. 
However, immaterial misstatement and any fraud or illegal acts discovered during the audit will be reported to the 
management (Dabroski, 2000). 
According to ISA 240 (revised), the objectives of external auditors are: 
i. To identify and assess the risk of material misstatement of the financial statements due to fraud by 
obtaining an understanding of the internal controls in respect of those assertions and ensure those 
controls are designed effectively. 
ii. Obtain sufficient appropriate audit evidence regarding the assessed risk of material misstatement 
due to fraud, through designing and implementing appropriate responses. 
iii. To respond appropriately to fraud or suspected fraud identified during audit and communicate 
same to those in charge of governance 
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The duties of the auditor are to primarily attest to the financial statements and internal controls relative to financial 
reporting, identify and assess risk related to financial reporting subject to material misstatement and to report fraud 
or suspected fraud to the managers. These processes must follow appropriate accounting and auditing standards 
including and conformance with Generally Acceptable Accounting Principles (GAAP). 
An external audit program encompasses engaging an independent auditor to perform a full-scope financial statement 
audit, a balance-sheet-only audit, an attestation of internal controls over financial reporting, or other agreed-upon 
external audit procedures. 
a. Financial statement audit: External auditing is traditionally associated with independent audits of financial 
statements. An independent audit of financial statements is designed to ensure that financial reports are prepared in 
accordance with GAAP. Independent financial statement audits are performed in accordance with GAAS. Their 
scope is sufficient to enable an auditor to express an opinion on the organization’s financial statements.  
b. Attestation of internal control structure governing financial reporting: This type of audit examines and 
reports on management’s assertion concerning the effectiveness of the internal controls over financial reporting. The 
auditor’s attestation may cover all internal controls relating to annual financial statement preparation or specified 
schedules of call reports. Under this engagement, management documents its assessment of internal controls and 
prepares a written assertion specifying the criteria used and opining on control effectiveness. The auditor performs 
the attestation in accordance with generally accepted standards for attestation engagements.  
c. Balance sheet audit: In this type of audit, an auditor examines and reports only on the balance sheet. As 
with financial statement audits, the auditor audits in accordance with GAAS, but does not examine or report on 
whether statements of income, changes to equity capital, or cash flow are fairly presented. 
d. Agreed-upon procedures: This type of audit, carried out by directors or other independent parties, entails 
specified or agreed-upon procedural reviews of the adequacy of internal controls and the accuracy of financial 
information. Such an audit is commonly referred to as a directors’ examination. The independent parties can be 
public accountants, certified internal auditors, certified bank auditors, certified information systems auditors, 
consulting firms, or other knowledgeable parties. 
An effective external audit function often provides the management with: 
i. Reasonable assurance about the effectiveness of internal controls over financial reporting, the accuracy 
and timeliness in recording transactions, and the accuracy and completeness of financial and regulatory 
reports. 
ii. An independent and objective view of an organization’s activities, including processes relative to 
financial reporting. 
iii. Information useful to management in maintaining an organization’s risk management processes.  
3.3 The Loopholes and the Need for Beyond the Audit Procedures and Rules in Combating Corruption 
1. The objective of this authentication process excludes fraud and corruption detection. It is assumed that 
when the internal control rules are kept and records are kept in accordance with GAAP, fraud and corruption is 
reduced to zero. This assumption has ignored collusion and capture, the human factor that hinders implementation of 
efficient system rule and encourages system failure. The duty to detect fraud and corruption is that of the public 
official (the agent) and not the auditor (a representative of the principal).  
 
2. Worse still, the auditor is engaged and paid by the public official on behalf of the principal. As the pay 
master he detects the tune. Refusal to dance to the tune of his pay master will mean no job in the future. This clause 
destroys the auditor’s independence and enhances his dependence. It gives the agents the power to capture willing 
parties to perpetrate corruption and form a syndicate to the detriment of the principal. This collusion extend even to 
the auditors the only hope of the principal  
 
3. The internal report of failures and inefficiencies of management (areas to be improved upon) is made only 
to the public official (agent) and is unknown to the principal.  
 
4. Auditing only seeks to ensure financial accountability. It ignores other forms of accountability; political, 
economic and social accountability. These other forms of accountability remain the sole responsibility of the agent. 
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What do we expect them to report, their failures or an invented success?   
In summary, these loopholes are a result of the inadequacy of the external audit focus, design and implementation as 
a strategy for combating corruption. Some of these inadequacies in design and implementation of anticorruption 
strategies are: 
a. It denies the principal (citizens) the opportunity to assess service delivery performance of the public 
officials or managers (agents). 
b. It does not empower citizens by supporting bottom-up reforms. It supports top-down reforms.  
c. It does not report or disseminate information to the citizens (principal) but to the public officials or 
managers (agents). 
These accounting and non-accounting approaches, techniques, processes and reform policies, designed to disrupt 
corruption operates on the assumption that the ‘system’ alone is faulty. Hence, most of the policies, techniques or 
reforms are designed to amend, restructure or redesign the system. Some have failed to recognize the human side to 
corruption, while others having recognized the human factor have failed to capture and contend these human 
tendencies in their anticorruption strategies. This has led to the continuous increase in the size, magnitude and level 
of infection.  
For external audit to improve its capacity to protect the interest, resources and assets of the citizens (principal) from 
corruption, corrupt public officials (agent) and ensure sustainable accountability, there is need therefore to go beyond 
the audit procedures and rules in addressing human tendencies, systems issues and limitations.  
4. The Proposed Technique and the Challenges 
All the propositions and suggestions will meet with little or no success if we do not learn from experience which 
strongly suggests that combating corruption requires an indirect approach that starts with its root causes. Such 
indirect approach requires adopting one or more of the several alternatives to traditional accountability and 
anticorruption strategies beyond audit procedures and rules. This can enhance the effectiveness of existing and 
suggested approaches. These alternatives include: 
1. Enlargement in audit emphasis to include fraud detection: 
Fraud and corruption thrive when accountability and transparency are absent. No doubt good financial reporting and 
auditing help reduce the misrepresentation that hides fraudulent operations and misleads the reader. For auditing to 
provide the desirable assurance that audited financial statements can be trusted to represent the economic activities 
they are intended to portray , given the sophistications of the agents (in defrauding the principal), the gap between 
stakeholder expectations and audit mandates must be closed. The gap is that the agent should not be responsible in 
exposing her crimes.  
Traditionally, Audit Institutions (AIs) have agreed that the primary responsibility for preventing and detecting 
corruption rests with the administrative authorities (agents),such as the police or anticorruption agencies (the agents’ 
instruments) and not the citizens or her agents (the audit institutions). Audit institutions have not seen fraud and 
corruption busting as their main goal; the approach has been to prevent corruption in the field rather than detecting 
illegal activities. The public, however, believes that AIs seek to detect fraud and corruption. 
This gap needs to be addressed by the AIs, which should put more emphasis on detecting fraud and corruption to 
shrink the expectation gap. They should continue to play an active role in raising awareness of the risks of fraud and 
corruption and fostering good governance and standards of conduct, but they should responsible for and focus more 
on detecting fraud and corruption. The agent cannot expose her crime; instead the crimes will be concealed the more 
if the responsibility should continue to rest on the agent. This can be done by combining controls audit procedures 
with financial attest audit procedures. Changing the audit emphasis will be a step in the right direction. This will 
meet with stiff opposition, but it is pertinent to ask why not? 
2. Creation of opposition led Accountability committees 
Rather than rely on regular audit committees opposition led committees should be created. These committees can act 
as whistle blowers, criticizing every activity that deviates from norms. This group stands the chance of being 
captured. However, whilst not captured, it can play a vital role in ensuring accountability by providing the principal 
with adequate information for decision to enforce punishment. 
3. Recognition and ensuring accountability in all spheres of the economy  
Public officers should be held accountable not only financially but, politically, economically and socially. This will 
enhance service delivery as it will give the principal the right to justice and punishment. 
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4. These alternatives to traditional audit mechanisms should be proactive  
The audit procedures are not proactive. The agent knows when the auditors will be invited. He has enough time 
rearrange himself and the events around his operations. The recommended methods should not be annually only, it 
can be at any time of the year or even more than once. If the owners are responsible for engaging the auditors, then 
such audit and investigation should be without notice to the agent. 
5. The Summary and Concluding Remarks  
Corruption thrives because the agents have technically crippled the power of the principal to demand for and enforce 
accountability. Although several measures have been developed to combat corruption, these measures ignore the vital 
element of the accountability relationship (man) and concentrate on modifying the systems of accountability. The 
auditing function of accounting, designed to give the principal control over the operations of the agent, is under the 
control of the agent. Its main object is not fraud detection; it is the agent that appoints the auditor, who reports to the 
agent and is paid by the agent. In most instances where corrupt practices are uncovered, the audit reports are always 
clean. Therefore, this rules and procedures must be changed in favor of the principal. This will empower the 
principal to demand for and ensure accountability and guarantee sustainable development. 
Combating corruption is not without conditions. It requires that: 
a. Measures to address corruption must not fail to adequately consider and integrate the underlying drivers or 
face the unlikelihood to generate profound and sustainable results. 
b. Such approach must not apply common policies and tools (that is, one-size-fits-all approaches) to countries 
in which acts of corruption and the quality of governance vary widely. Doing so increases the likely to fail. 
c. There should be a strong and focused local “principal and ownership” if the suggested strategies are to be 
successful and sustainable. 
This discussion confirms most policy conclusion that due recognition of the initial conditions is critical for the 
effectiveness of anticorruption policies. Anticorruption strategies are unlikely to succeed unless they recognize the 
pecking order of reforms in poor governance environments. To be sustainable anticorruption strategies must extend 
beyond the audit procedures and rules and be proactive. 
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Table 2 Trends in combating fraud and corruption 
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